NBA extension season is here, and numbers only tell part of the story

The NBA number on the table is never just the number. It’s who can wait, who can match, who runs into an apron and who actually has somewhere else to go if the answer is no.

So with extension season upon us, here’s a look at where the leverage actually sits in some of the league’s more interesting contract situations.

Jalen Duren and the Pistons

This is the staring contest that matters most.

Detroit’s offer is believed to be around $35 million annually, or roughly $175 million over five years. Duren’s camp wants north of $40 million.

After making All-NBA Third Team, Duren became eligible for a 30 percent max that could reach five years and $287 million from Detroit. He’s not getting that, of course. The question is how far below it the Pistons can reasonably go.

Detroit has plenty working in its favor. Other teams can only offer four years and roughly $177 million, and the Pistons can match an offer sheet anyway. More importantly, there just isn’t much cap space around the league.

Then there’s the postseason. Duren averaged 19.5 points and 10.5 rebounds during the regular season, but slipped to 10.2 and 8.5 in 14 playoff games. Paul Reed even closed some of those minutes against Cleveland.

That’s part of Detroit’s argument.

Duren does have one very real hammer: the $9.6 million qualifying offer. Take it and he can become an unrestricted free agent in 2027.

One league executive suggested another way of looking at it. If Duren takes the qualifying offer and then lands a 25 percent max next summer, his five-year haul could come to about $204.5 million.

In other words, perhaps Detroit simply gets there now and everybody avoids the headache.

There’s also this: Cade Cunningham wants him back.

My guess? Somewhere in the mid-to-high $30 million range annually, perhaps with a structure that helps Detroit prepare for its next negotiation.

Which brings us to…

Ausar Thompson and the Pistons

Thompson’s situation is tied pretty directly to whatever happens with Duren.

Detroit can reasonably argue that Duren is the All-NBA player and therefore the first order of business. Thompson’s case is built more around his availability, defensive impact and importance to a team coming off a 60-win season.

He doesn’t have Duren’s All-NBA leverage or the same immediate qualifying-offer threat.

What he does have is time. And eventually, Detroit has to decide how many members of this core it intends to pay.

Anthony Black and the Magic

This one is as much about Orlando’s books as it is about Black.

Paolo Banchero and Franz Wagner already have max contracts. Jalen Suggs and Desmond Bane are expensive. Wendell Carter Jr. is on the books, too.

Give Black something in the neighborhood of $20 million annually and Orlando suddenly has an awful lot of money tied up in six players.

The Magic can wait, allow Black to become a restricted free agent in 2027 and dare somebody else to make the offer.

Of course, that can create its own problem. Black would then become exactly the type of young starter another team with cap space might target.

If Orlando pays him now, somebody else eventually may have to go. That’s not really speculation. It’s math.

Cason Wallace and the Thunder

Same sport, different apron.

Shai Gilgeous-Alexander’s extension begins hitting the books in 2027-28, and Oklahoma City is already projected near or above the second apron with only part of its roster accounted for.

A Wallace extension in the neighborhood of four years and $110 million would only add to it. Sam Presti’s advantage is simple: He doesn’t have to do anything yet.

Wallace’s argument is equally obvious. He already has All-Defensive Team credentials, and Chet Holmgren and Jalen Williams have been paid.

Eventually, OKC may have to choose between Wallace and one of its more expensive veterans, perhaps Alex Caruso or Isaiah Hartenstein.

That’s how one of those famous “good problems to have” eventually becomes a trade.

Keyonte George and the Jazz

George just produced the best season of his career on a rebuilding team.

That works both ways. If Utah believes the 23-point, six-assist production is real, something in the $30 million-to-$35 million annual range becomes understandable.

If the Jazz believe some of it was a product of circumstance, they can wait.

They already have major money committed to Jaren Jackson Jr. and Lauri Markkanen, and Darryn Peterson is now part of the equation.

George can strengthen his case considerably with another big season. Utah can counter by waiting to see how all these pieces actually fit.

Brandin Podziemski and the Warriors

Here, the gap itself is the story.

Golden State reportedly would prefer something in the $15 million-to-$18 million range annually. Podziemski’s side is looking more toward $22 million-to-$24 million.

The Warriors have reason to protect their future flexibility, particularly if their plan is to create meaningful room in 2027.

They’ve also been through this before with Moses Moody and Jonathan Kuminga. They’re clearly not afraid of letting a negotiation linger.

Podziemski has a case, though. He played all 82 games, became a starter and is still just 23. He has also said he wants to remain with Golden State.

That helps, but everybody remembers how quickly these things can become uncomfortable when a young player believes he’s being undervalued.

The sensible middle looks like $18 million-to-$20 million annually. Anything much lower or higher feels more like negotiating than reality.

Brandon Miller and the Hornets

There’s considerably less drama here.

Charlotte has clean books and little reason to play games with Miller. Amen Thompson’s five-year, $208 million extension also provides a pretty convenient marker. Something in that neighborhood makes sense.

Even if Miller reaches restricted free agency, it’s difficult to imagine Charlotte letting him leave. So his leverage comes mostly from timing and comparable contracts, not the threat of another destination.

Scoot Henderson and the Trail Blazers

Portland holds most of the cards here.

Henderson has had three uneven, injury-filled seasons, leaving the Blazers with little reason to rush into a major commitment.

They can wait, let him play and deal with restricted free agency later. Henderson can change the equation himself, of course. Put together a healthy breakout season and suddenly Portland has a very different decision.

Right now, though, that’s a possibility more than leverage.

Dereck Lively II and the Mavericks

Injuries have complicated this one, too. Lively has appeared in just 98 games over his first three seasons, giving Dallas every reason to wait.

His upside remains the argument for getting something done. Everyone remembers the version of Lively who helped the Mavericks reach the Finals.

If he plays 70-plus games and looks like that player again, his negotiating position changes considerably. Dallas could then find itself moving other money to make everything work.

Today, the Mavericks can wait. After a healthy season? Maybe not.

What actually matters

There are a few themes running through all of this.

The qualifying offer remains perhaps the strongest weapon a player can actually use. Offer sheets don’t mean much without teams possessing the cap space to make them. Duren taking the QO and putting unrestricted free agency on the table is different.

All-NBA honors can change a player’s maximum salary without necessarily changing his actual market. Duren’s 30 percent max eligibility is useful in negotiations, but comparable contracts matter more.

Then there are the aprons. Orlando paying Black, Oklahoma City paying Wallace and Detroit eventually paying both Duren and Thompson don’t happen in a vacuum. Every young player who gets paid can make the veteran beside him a little more expendable.

That’s how extensions eventually become trades. And with cap growth expected to slow in 2027-28, the difference between $35 million and $40 million annually isn’t merely something for agents and executives to argue about.

That’s another rotation player. So, yeah, the numbers matter. But the real question in these negotiations is the same as it’s always been: Who can afford to say no?